Quick Look: Ukraine's Aerial Defenses
What 51,000 drone and missile attacks reveal about modern air defense
Since January 2024, Russia has launched over 50,000 drones and 945 ballistic missiles at Ukraine. The Financial Times and the Centre for Information Resilience recently published a dataset that details how many attacks were launched and how many were intercepted.
It reveals distinct defensive challenges. For drones, sheer volume dominates. For ballistic missiles, interceptor capability, battery coverage, and interceptor availability all drive outcomes.
Drones
First, we’ll take a look at how drone launches have scaled and their corresponding intercept rate.
Attack volume has increased nearly 12x since the beginning of 2024. In Q1 2024, an average of 452 drones were launched each month. In Q3 2025, this reached 5,360 per month.
Most drones are intercepted. Monthly intercept rates have varied between 80% and 97%, with an average of 89%. Defensive systems have scaled proportionally to attacks.
But many still break through. While the intercept rates remain high, the rising launch rate has led to a higher hit rate. In Q1 2024, just 71 drones per month hit their targets. In Q3 2025, 725 per month did so. That’s more drones breaking through than were even launched in early 2024.
Three (potentially diplomatic) events interrupted the ramping trend. Attack volume dropped notably in three months: April 2025 (-42% versus the prior month, coinciding with ceasefire discussions), August 2025 (-34%, aligned with the Trump-Putin Alaska summit), and December 2024 (-23%, cause unclear). While we can’t establish a direct link between these diplomatic events and the reduction in attacks, it seems Russia may have reduced attack volumes around these engagements.
Defenses must keep up. Excluding the three diplomatic outliers, attack volume is accelerating. Defenses have largely matched the scaling. However, if attack scaling outpaces defensive measures by just a few percentage points, it translates to hundreds more successful strikes monthly.
Ballistic Missiles
Next, we’ll contrast the drone dynamics with those of ballistic missiles. Markedly different trends emerge.
Lower volume, higher stakes. Since January 2024, Russia has launched between 17 and 97 ballistic missiles per month. The average attack volume over the period is 45 per month, but with significant monthly variability.
Most are not intercepted. Only 8% of ballistic missiles were intercepted in Q1 2024. This improved to 36% between June and August 2025. However, the intercept rate plummeted to 6% in September 2025. The drop is partly attributed to enhanced terminal maneuvering by the Russian munitions.
More than one ballistic missile hits Ukraine every day. In Q3 2025, an average of 42 ballistic missiles evaded defenses per month. This equates to an average of just under 1.5 missiles per day.
Maneuvering defeats current interceptors. Russia is primarily using short-range ballistic missiles: the Iskander and Kinzhal systems. These weapons recently implemented enhanced terminal maneuvering specifically designed to evade Patriot interceptors. The warheads steer just before impact, causing interceptors to miss.
Limited coverage is a fundamental factor. Ukraine operates seven Patriot batteries. With each battery defending approximately 100-200 square kilometers, total coverage represents less than 1% of Ukraine’s territory. Practically, seven batteries mean seven defended locations, such as major cities or critical infrastructure sites. Ballistic missiles launched into uncovered areas cannot be intercepted.
Changing the calculus requires more batteries and interceptors, with enhanced capabilities. Additional batteries expand defended areas. Improved interceptors’ counter maneuvering systems. More of them enable Ukraine to keep up with a potential ramp of ballistic missile attacks.
Implications
This dataset illustrates divergent defensive challenges. Ukrainian data scientist Petro Ivaniuk maintains a more detailed dataset breaking down strikes by platform. It’s updated nearly daily and provides the foundation for more detailed analyses.
One key data gap is the number of intercepts attempted. This would reveal how many defensive munitions are expended per successful intercept and to what degree the low ballistic missile interception rates stem from interceptor shortages or failures. In other words, how many missiles go unengaged simply because no interceptors are available?
The contrast is stark between the situation in Ukraine and the performance of Israel’s missile defense. During conflicts with Iran and Hamas, Israeli defenses routinely intercepted 75%+ of cruise and ballistic missiles. This is accomplished using multilayered defense systems with numerous interceptor platforms and complete territorial coverage.
For defense programs under development, these patterns define focus areas. Drone defense demands high-volume, cost-effective interceptors that can scale elastically. Ballistic missile defense requires both expanded coverage (more batteries), enhanced capability against maneuvering threats (better interceptors), and increased magazine depth (more interceptors).
Note: My company, Long Wall, develops missile defense technology, but it is not related to the systems or statistics presented here.
These solutions sound heavily dependent on USA technology. It's not clear on any given day if the political support from the US administration is there.